March 2026 Regular Press Conference : President Hayashi's Message

• On January 5, we received a request for information from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry pursuant to the Electricity Business Act. This request was issued after the Nuclear Regulation Authority confirmed, during its review of Units 3 and 4 of the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station for compliance with the new regulatory standards, that the evaluation of seismic motion at the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station had been conducted using inappropriate methods.
• Additionally, on January 14, we received a request for a report from the Nuclear Regulation Authority under the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Reactors, etc., for the purpose of conducting a detailed investigation into the facts and causes of this matter.
• In light of this, we submitted a report today to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry and the Nuclear Regulation Authority in response to these requests, and I would like to discuss the contents of that report.

Scope of This Report

• To clarify the facts of this matter in a manner that ensures transparency and fairness, we have established an investigation committee composed solely of external experts who maintain strict independence and neutrality, and we are currently having them conduct an investigation.
• The investigation committee's work is ongoing, and we are not yet at a stage where we can disclose its details. However, today we are reporting on the matters we can currently confirm and report as facts, as well as the direction of our response, based on the facts known at the time of the initial announcement on January 5 of this year, along with the results of our review of documents and records related to this matter that we currently possess.
• Please note that because statements regarding the responsibility of specific individuals and the determination of facts must be made with the utmost caution, the matters we can currently confirm and report as facts are limited.
• Furthermore, we have not yet been able to confirm what impact this matter has had on the selection of representative waves for the standard seismic motion or other related results.
• Details will continue to be clarified through the investigation committee's ongoing investigation.
  

Business Processes Related to the Formulation of Standard Seismic Motion

• Regarding the business processes related to the formulation of standard seismic motion, the following issues were identified:
• The company had not formulated individual work plans that clearly defined specific and detailed content.
• During seismic motion evaluation, failure to create approval documents regarding detailed evaluation conditions, instead providing instructions to contractors via email or meetings
• Operations continued for an extended period without internal regulations reflecting rules regarding technical checks of review materials by external experts

and other issues.

Regarding Methods 1 and 2

• Of the 225 representative wave cases selected by our company, it was confirmed that Method 1 was used in at least 105 cases between approximately 2012 and fiscal year 2021.
• Furthermore, according to interviews with relevant parties, the selection of representative waves using Method 2 was reportedly conducted in 80 cases between approximately 2018 and 2019. Upon reviewing commissioned reports and other documents, it was confirmed that this method was used in at least three cases during fiscal year 2018.
• However, of the 225 cases, there are 77 cases for which no basis could be identified to determine whether they correspond to Method ① or ②, and further investigation is required; therefore, these case numbers are subject to change.
• It has been confirmed that both Method ① and Method ② were carried out within the Nuclear Civil Engineering Department; however, the specific scope of actors and individuals involved, including those from other departments, has not yet been determined.
• The specific circumstances leading to the adoption of Method ① remain unclear at this time.
• Method ② was implemented in May 2018 when it became necessary to recalculate and analyze seismic motion by resetting the depth for inland crustal earthquakes, including the A-17 fault.
• Subsequently, it was also applied to the selection of representative waves in cases involving branch faults in interplate earthquakes and interactions with inland crustal earthquakes.
  
  

Repeated Internal Concerns and Responses

• Since 2018, concerns have been raised repeatedly within the Nuclear Civil Engineering Department regarding issues such as the failure to include Method ① and Method ② in the review documents; however, the review documents and other materials were never revised.

Course of Action

• Next, I would like to discuss the course of action we intend to take based on the facts that have come to light at this time.
• While the investigation by the Investigation Committee is ongoing and the facts we have been able to ascertain at this stage are limited, as a company that should contribute to the development of society and fulfill its responsibilities with a high sense of ethics, we deeply regret the concern and inconvenience we have caused to so many people. We believe it is necessary to proactively and steadily address the issues that require improvement within our company.
• To transform ourselves into a company that regains the trust of our stakeholders, and with a strong determination to ensure that such inappropriate incidents never occur again, we will immediately launch a company-wide initiative centered on three pillars: "Transformation of Mindset and Behavior," "Transformation of Organization and Organizational Culture," and "Strengthening of Rules and Systems."
• Regarding the first pillar, "Transformation of Mindset and Behavior," our management team will undertake a thorough transformation of mindset and behavior with a strong commitment.
• Specifically, to ensure that all executives and employees can continue to practice compliance by placing our company's raison d'être and purpose at the core of their own judgment and actions, the management team—led by myself—will take the lead by setting an example based on the Code of Conduct (Core Values) scheduled to be established. We will also continue to provide practical training and awareness programs for employees at all levels.
• Regarding the second point, "Transformation of the Organization and Organizational Culture," we will introduce mechanisms within the Nuclear Power Division to incorporate external perspectives and opinions. We will foster an organizational culture where employees with diverse values can engage in open discussions on a daily basis, establish an environment where mutual checks and balances function effectively, and explore measures to bridge the gap between the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant and the head office.
• Furthermore, across the entire company, we will work to introduce and strengthen the implementation of human resources systems that enhance organizational transparency and psychological safety, such as accelerating personnel exchanges and further utilizing multi-perspective reviews. We will also have the younger generation, who will lead the future, examine and propose from scratch what the Chubu Electric Power Group should look like in the future, and based on that, we will implement concrete measures.
• Regarding the third point, "Strengthening Rules and Systems," we will work to refine and clarify business processes by incorporating external perspectives, establish a new quality assurance organization directly under the head of the Nuclear Power Division, and strengthen our internal audit system to improve the accuracy of risk assessments.
• Furthermore, in our company-wide risk management, we will keep the risk of misconduct in mind and conduct checks on departments suspected of having organizational issues—such as prolonged assignments or the personalization of tasks—that could contribute to misconduct. We will also strengthen mechanisms for preventing misconduct through a second line of defense, such as counseling by external lawyers, working in conjunction with the responsible departments.

Next Steps

• As the investigation is still ongoing, the measures outlined here are merely a preliminary direction. Moving forward, we plan to take the investigation committee's findings into account, conduct a more in-depth analysis from the perspective of a fundamental restructuring, develop concrete measures, and formulate measures to prevent a recurrence.

Summary

• In closing, I believe that we must begin addressing issues related to our corporate governance, compliance, and organizational culture—as well as implementing measures that include a fundamental restructuring of our nuclear division—starting with those actions that can be taken immediately, without waiting for the results of the investigation committee's inquiry.
• We believe that committing ourselves wholeheartedly to this effort with unwavering resolve is the key to restoring trust and transforming our company into one that is trusted once again. As the head of Chubu Electric Power, I will fulfill my responsibility to all stakeholders, both inside and outside the company.
• Once again, I would like to offer my deepest and most sincere apologies for the immense concern and inconvenience this incident has caused to our stakeholders, particularly the local community, as well as for the profound distrust it has generated among the broader public.
• This ends my presentation.
  

Documents