Press Release

Press Release

Causes and Countermeasures for a Fire Inside a Control Panel at the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant's 275 kV Switching Station (Outside the Radiation Control Zone)

October 20, 2026
Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.

We hereby report the results of our investigation into the cause of the fire that occurred on September 15, 2026, at the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant's 275 kV switching station, along with the countermeasures we have identified.
We deeply apologize for any inconvenience or concern this incident may have caused.

1. Sequence of Events Leading to the Fire

Based on on-site investigations and verification of the facts, the sequence of events leading to the fire is as follows:
(1) As part of preparatory work for an inspection of the power transmission equipment, a company employee (operator) performed an operation in the Central Control Room of Unit 3 to switch the grounding switch (Note 1) located within the 275 kV Switching Station to the "ON" position.
(2) As a result of this operation, the coil that controls the closing and opening of the grounding switch was energized.
(3) Because a safety stopper designed to prevent malfunction of the grounding switch was engaged, the grounding switch did not move to the "ON" position, and the coil remained energized.
(4) The coil in question was designed to be energized only for a short period during the "ON" operation; prolonged energization caused abnormal overheating, leading to the fire.

2. Results of the Cause Investigation

The direct cause of the fire was the execution of the "ON" operation on the grounding switch while the stopper was engaged. Furthermore, an investigation into the indirect causes that led to this operation confirmed the following:
(1) The operator performed the operation in accordance with the procedure manual for coordination and communication with the power supply control center (hereinafter referred to as the "Coordination Procedure Manual"), but failed to consult the procedure manual used for operating the equipment itself (hereinafter referred to as the "Operating Procedure Manual"), which should have been checked concurrently. Since the Coordination Procedure Manual did not include detailed operating procedures such as releasing the stopper, the operator mistakenly believed that it was not necessary to release the stopper during the operation.
(2) Unlike the grounding switch in question, other grounding switches are operated without using a stopper in the "OFF" position, meaning it was not necessary to release the stopper when switching to the "ON" position. Consequently, the operator mistakenly believed that it was not necessary to release the stopper when operating this grounding switch either.
(3) The shift supervisor did not clearly instruct the operator on which manual to use. Furthermore, the shift supervisor assumed that the operator would use the operating procedure manual and did not verify which manual was being used.

3. Measures to Prevent Recurrence

We will implement the following measures to prevent a recurrence of this incident.
(1) We will clearly distinguish between the intended purposes of the adjustment procedure manual and the operating procedure manual, and designate only the operating procedure manual—which contains detailed operating procedures—as the manual to be used for operating the equipment. We will ensure that only these manuals are used when operating the equipment.
(2) We will standardize the use of the stopper in line with other grounding switches, establishing an operating procedure in which the stopper is not used when the grounding switch is in the "OFF" position.
(3) We will provide refresher training to the on-duty supervisor regarding their role in operational management, including instructions and verification of the manuals to be used.
Furthermore, from the perspective of further improving safety, we will systematically replace coils with a circuit configuration similar to the one that caught fire this time with coils that are resistant to prolonged energization.

(Note 1) A grounding switch is a device used during equipment inspection and maintenance work to connect equipment or wires to the ground to dissipate electricity, thereby preventing electric shock to workers and damage to the equipment. Setting the grounding switch to the "ON" position connects the equipment and wires to the ground.

Previous Announcements

Fire in a Control Panel at the 275-kV Switching Station (Outside the Radiation Control Zone) at the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant (Announced September 15, 2026)

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